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International Monetary Fund (IMF) interventions have evolved in the last sixty years based on the predominant 
orthodoxy in world political economy with a focus in recent decades on encouraging liberal market conditions to secure inward 
investment and capital flows. This has resulted in a dominant model of policy conditions and transfer, but with a debate about 
the contextual relevance. This paper uses an innovative approach to longitudinal research, called Dynamic Pattern Synthesis, to 
compare the economic performance of South American nations between 2000-2015. The results from using this method 
illustrates multifinality in the IMF outcome of encouraging foreign direct investment. A complex configuration of influences on 
this outcome are evidenced. Complexity theory is used to explain the results, with the continent defined as a complex system that 
does not respond to simple causal policy mechanisms, but rather displays different patterns of political and economic influence 
in the context of global market instability. Different foreign direct investment configurations result, and these illustrate that 
international monetary and policy interventions need to be contextual and cannot make simplistic and universal assumptions 
about policy problems and their mechanistic solutions. 
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Introduction 
The IMF is an international financier that lends to its member countries when they experience 
balance of payments problems. Its funding comes from deposits from all member countries. The purpose 
of its loans are to facilitate an individual country being able to accumulate adequate international reserves 
and to stabilize their currency. This should allow a continuation with payments for imports and to 
successfully engage in international trade. The IMF assumes that its financing will create macroeconomic 
stability that drives growth. They also impose conditionalities on loans: for example, demanding 
reductions in government current accounts and spending (Thacker, 1999). Conditionalities are designed 
to cover the scope and detail of an IMF intervention and the specific tools used to monitor progress (IMF, 
2019). These measures are intended to preserve IMF funds by guaranteeing that the country’s balance of 
payments will be enough to permit it to repay the loan. It has been argued by a previous IMF chief 
economist that the primary goal of the IMF lending is to enable a country to borrow from other sources, 
for example, to attract capital from international investors, as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): “The IMF 
is…tasked with helping countries hit by financial crises regain access to private credit markets” (Rogoff, 
cited in Inman, 2019). Indeed, recent academic scholarship has attempted to identify this ‘catalistic effect’ 
of IMF interventions in stimulating FDI (Breen & Egan, 2019). Here, it is suggested that the presence of 
an IMF intervention may serve as ‘a seal of approval’ accrediting recipient nations, thereby encouraging 
FDI inflows (Bauer, Cruz, & Graham, 2012). This approach to IMF activities is what is often regarded as 
the ‘neo-liberal turn’ in international relations, occurring after the 1970s, and where international 
organisations turned increasingly to facilitating open global markets as the fundamental paradigm to drive 
activity (Jessop, 2002; Stiglitz, 2002; Vreeland, 2006). In this paper, we consider how the presence or 
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absence of IMF interventions has influenced the FDI profile of South American countries, while also 
considering the influence of other key economic indicators, and situate this policy system in the 
framework of complexity theory. 
Background 
The 1980s provided the scenario for IMF intervention and application of policy conditionalities in 
exchange for loans during the Latin American region’s debt crisis that saw the wide imposition of 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (Pastor, 1989). These programmes pushed national governments 
towards open, global market economic approaches. Authors such as Naomi Klein have explored the 
lineage of these economic policies, traced it back to the economic 'shock therapy' introduced in Chile by 
the Pinochet regime in the 1970s, and referred to this in terms of 'disaster capitalism' (Klein, 2007). Thus, 
the IMF has been described by critical literature as one of the global institutional overseers of a broader 
neoliberal globalization project that aims to enforce market-based forms of development policies, a 
concentration of power in the hands of transnational corporations, and the establishment of freedom of 
movement for capital in search of investment opportunities (Greig, Hulme & Turner, 2007; Aalbers, 2013).  
The South American experience in the 1980s resulted in significant increases in inequality and 
poverty (Klein, 2007; Kohl & Farthing, 2009). As a result, some authors have referred to the IMF as part of 
the ‘unholy trinity’ (along with the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation) (Peet, 2010), or referred 
to this organisation as a predator in a global system of economic oppression that reflects the interests of 
capital and of the global north (Chossudovsky, 1999). The historical experience with the IMF of many 
countries in South America is partly responsible for explaining the attitude of public officials and why 
some left-leaning nationalist governments were elected to office in the period of our study (2000-2015): 
from Brazil (2003-2016), to Argentina (2001-2015), Ecuador (2007-2017), or Bolivia (2006-2019). Often 
following popular uprisings, these governments were referred to as ‘the pink tide’ (Spronk, 2008). A 
common theme of these governments during this period was the rejection of neoliberal economic 
principles and of the international institutions that promote them (De la Barra & Dello Buono, 2009). Here 
is a different influence on international relations, one that we might see as synonymous with Neo-Marxism 
and the idea of a nation state that still has some relative autonomy from the power of global capital and 
finance. 
The Argentinian IMF relationship hiatus was marked by the collapse of the economy in 2001 and 
a long lapse in associated international financial relations until the recent 2018 facilitation of a $50Bn 
rescue package (Mander, 2018). All this illustrates an opposition to the work of the IMF in some of the 
countries that need international assistance and distrust in its underpinning ideology and associated policy 
agendas. If the IMF has moved towards making sure developing countries operate within a certain global 
economic framework underwritten by powerful economies with comparative advantage and currency 
supremacy, it is not surprising that many poorer countries have been through periods when they have 
resisted working with it. But to cast the international relations of the IMF approach into a simple duality 
of global capitalism versus global anti-capitalism is too simplistic. For this reason, we turn to the 
framework of complexity theory. 
Theoretical Perspective: Complexity of IMF Interventions 
Complexity theory has had an increasing impact on approaches to social science research with a 
growing number of sources citing this approach (Byrne & Callaghan, 2013). In this paper, we argue the 
evaluation of an international policy instrument like IMF loans requires such a new theoretical framework. 
This is because the cases involved (nation states) and the external context (the global economy), are always 
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changing, and any intervention mechanism, like conditional lending, is likely to be highly dependent on 
time and space diversity in the underlying context and mechanisms (Gerrits, 2012). There are multiple 
sub systems of interaction, including intergovernmental cooperation, and capital, trade and labour flows 
influenced by the market, but also regulated by governments. One of the best summaries of the 
contribution that complexity makes to these policy challenges came from the late Paul Cilliers (1998, 3-4). 
For the purposes of this research article, we have paraphrased this to define the socio-political-economic 
system of national countries sharing the continent of South America. 
In our research, the environment is the global economy, and the sub system of interest is the 
majority of the largest South American national economies. Many have experienced at least one IMF 
intervention in the period 2000-2015. This historical period was chosen to reflect a substantial period 
before and after the global financial crisis of 2008. The system is defined by many different levels, cases, 
and elements, in accordance with Cilliers’ narrative. At the top level is the global economic system with 
its flows of finance, trade, and labour and the international financing institutions of the IMF with its 
economic and political agenda, as dictated by the dominant world economic powers, like the United States 
and European Union. Although we are focused in this paper on the international role of the IMF, there 
are other global institutions of importance at this level, such as the World Bank and United Nations. 
Beneath this global ‘super system’ is the level of the nation state, and in this study, we compare nations 
and whether they have experienced IMF interventions. We refer to these nations as ‘cases’ and apply a 
case-based research method, as explained in our methods section below. 
Cilliers stated that cases (in our research, these are the nation states) are defined by the 
relationships and interactions between them and across the system. Also, in our research we observe the 
influence in international relations of the powers and functions of global institutions like the IMF. Cilliers 
asserted that the relationship between cases in a system is not static, but dynamic, so there is no fixed state 
in the relationships between nation states and the international institutions that influence them. There 
may be periods of stability in these relationships, but also periods of instability, and over time we must 
expect different changes and paces of change. Public policy is designed to promote aspects of certainty 
and stability and to limit instability when the market is seen as potentially destabilizing. Such a view of 
the need for international policy was at the heart of the birth of the IMF in international relations, at the 
Bretton Woods post war agreement.  In this sense, the IMF should operate in what Snowden & Boone 
(2007) describe as the ‘zone of complexity’. It seeks to increase economic stability rather than instability 
and potential chaos.  
Another observation of Cilliers is that the dynamic interactions of cases in complex systems vary 
in volume and frequency, but are more likely to be influenced by interactions with other cases in their 
locality. In international relations, we can think of local system relations being the reality that neighbours 
are important (Haynes & Haynes, 2016; Collier, 2008). Nations are likely to be influenced by those on their 
geographical borders. Similarly, interactions and communications are quite likely to get scaled up from 
these localised relations. This is one important influence on a nation in addition to the capital flows 
dominated by the wealthiest nations and institutions. Behaviour (like the type of communication and 
requests made to the IMF, or government decisions to ignore the IMF) are quite likely to be copied, leading 
to ‘positive feedback’ where nations, their institutions, and elites copy certain approaches to policy, 
governance, and investment. Governments may copy policy ideas, including approaches negotiated with 
monetary lenders like the IMF, or political decisions to ignore the IMF. Similarly, for example, large 
investors may exit capital from certain countries and regions of the world and copy each other’s behaviour. 
Interventions, including international policy, can be used to check such feedback and to create what 
(Meadows, 2009) calls ‘balancing feedback’. IMF policy interventions might be thought of in this way. 
Finally, Cilliers recognizes the importance of history for a system and its behaviour, as cases 
(nations) are always influenced by their previous experience. There is no ‘year zero’ for nation states. This 
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means that while countries are changing, they are always to some extent influenced by their history. Yet 
countries have some agency as they move forward. This makes complexity research interested in how 
different or similar countries are over time, as cases are not pre-determined alone by history but also 
subject to numerous internal and external factors, not least the interactive relations that take place between 
them (Byrne, 2005).  
Historical comparative advantage is important in the working of global economics. The supreme 
economic power of the dollar in the global capital market place is a major distorting factor for poorer 
countries. This makes them vulnerable to capital movements that are unhelpful to their own ability to 
raise capital. History dictates that there is no stable economic ‘level playing field’. Ideally, global 
institutions would build positive international relations by mitigating such extremes of comparative 
disadvantage (Stiglitz, 2006). The task of individual nations to find the right domestic economic policy in 
such shifting international dynamics is extremely difficult.  In their seminal review of complexity theory 
and public policy, Geyer and Rihani (2010, p. 141) conclude on an optimal policy environment: 
‘There are some rules to follow; create a stable institutional framework, encourage decentralized 
local interactions, avoid civil strife and a stifling state structure… However, there is no perfect 
pattern for exactly how a country should stay within these boundaries.’ 
Given the above theoretical framework, we argue that complexity theory is an appropriate approach 
through which to try and understand the interventions of the IMF in the workings of nation states and 
their political economies in South America. 
Method 
Social scientists who seek to apply a complexity theoretical framework to their applied research 
use a variety of methods. Often, they are critical of cross-sectional, single time point modelling and linear 
based multi-variate models, fearing that these methods are likely to give a simplistic, partial, and static 
view of complex dynamic circumstances (Harvey & Reed, 1996; Reed & Harvey 1992). As a result, we have 
seen in the ‘turn to complexity’ (Urry, 2005) the promoting of mixed methods, longitudinal,  and case-
based approaches. Longitudinal case-based approaches show the dynamics of case patterns over time 
(Byrne, 1998). Gerrits & Verweij (2016. p. 8) comment, “there is a need for methods that retain the complex 
details of particular cases and that compare those cases in a systematic and transparent manner”. In case-
based methods, cases are “a complex combination of properties, a specific whole that should not be lost 
or obscured in the course of the analysis – this is a holistic perspective” (Berg-Schlosser, et al, 2009. p. 6). 
These methods should assist in avoiding over-simplification, where understanding the diversity of 
cases is lost at the expense of over-emphasizing their similarity. In short, cases may be similar in some 
respects, but they are also likely to be different in others. A longitudinal case-based approach enables the 
researcher to better ascertain whether cases are becoming more similar or more different over time. One 
recent innovation to achieve such complex understanding was the integration of agent-based modelling 
with the case-based approach (Castellani, Barbrook-Johnson, & Schimpf, 2019). Pagliarin & Gerrits (2020) 
have recently developed a longitudinal approach to Qualitative Comparative Analysis. One method for 
examining the dynamic similarities and differences in cases over time in complex circumstances is 
Dynamic Pattern Synthesis (DPS). This method combines exploratory cluster analysis with explanatory 
configurational approaches to case analysis and association (Haynes, 2018). 
Dynamic Pattern Synthesis examines the similarity and difference of cases at the different time 
points selected and the extent to which cases are similar and different over time. This can also be related 
to a particular outcome variable. In this research the outcome variable is Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). 
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The reason for this is that the IMF has stated their ambition to intervene in nation states to enable them 
to attract new investment from global capital markets.  
The DPS method is used in this paper to explore and compare the case interaction with some core 
economic indicators. The cases are twelve countries in South America, including those that experienced 
IMF interventions in the period 2000-2015. These countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela. A hierarchical cluster 
analysis (HCA) explores the influence of selected key economic variables on the similarity and differences 
of these countries (Pastor, 2010). The choice of variables is influenced by the core macroeconomic 
variables monitored by the IMF and similar international organisations. The full list of variables analyzed 
in the exploratory cluster analysis is in table 1. Cluster dendrograms (figures 1 – 3 in the results section) 
reveal the similarity groupings at each time point and can be used to begin to understand changes over 
the timescale used. 
 
Code Explanation 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows (annual percentage of GDP) 
GDPPC  Gross Domestic Product, Growth per capita (annual percentage) 
GGNLB General Government net lending/borrowing (annual percentage) 
IACP Inflation, average consumer prices percentage change 
NBTT Net barter, terms of trade index (2000 = 100) 
ODA Net Overseas Development Assistance received per capita (Current US$) 
IMF prior 
intervention 
Was there an IMF loan, in the preceding historical period? 
(This variable is only used in the configurational stage of analysis, after the initial cluster 
explorations) 
 
Table 1 List of Political Economy Variables included1 
 
Configurational tables can then be used with the same dataset to examine the influence of variables 
on cluster formulation and how these configurations change over time. To do this, the variable individual 
case scores are also considered with regard to their point on the central tendency of the variable 
distribution, either being above threshold, or below threshold. The central tendency point used is the 
median. The mean and standard deviation statistics are also provided in these tables, as points of reference. 
Tables of case configurations are used to identify any clusters of cases that share the same variable 
threshold.  An additional variable is added to this configurational modelling to evaluate the influence of 
IMF interventions. This is a dichotomous variable – countries that did experience prior IMF loans, and 
countries that did not. When a cluster, or group of countries of interest, share the same threshold score 
on a given table, these similar scores are either shaded in black with white text to represent a shared score 
pattern above threshold, or shaded in grey to represent a shared score pattern below threshold. When 
analyzing the tables in the results, the Boolean convention of UPPERCASE equals above the median, 
lowercase equals below the median, is used (Ragin, 1987; Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). The results tables can 
be used to identify which threshold scores are consistently shared by all members of a cluster or group.  
 
 
1 Our variable selection assumes that, given the mission statement of the IMF, its activities are more likely to have an influence 
on certain macroeconomic undertakings of a country. For this reason, we selected six macroeconomic indicators likely to be 
impacted by an IMF intervention.   
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Results 
Figure 1 shows the clusters resulting from the 2000 data analysis where six macro-economic 
variables (table 1) have been entered into the analysis. The resulting clusters of similarity are: cluster one 
– Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Chile; cluster two – Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia; cluster 3 Ecuador 
and Venezuela.  Guyana (4) and Suriname (5) are outliers.  
 
 
Figure 1 HCA Dendrogram: Core Economic Characteristics, South American Countries, 2000 
 
Table 2 shows the data format, including the addition of the cluster membership variable and the 
new IMF prior loan variable. The configurational approach helps to validate the clusters by explaining 
variable influences on each cluster membership. The evidence of shared shaded threshold scores suggests 
that some of the clusters are best subdivided into a and b pairs, as in this format they then share more 
threshold shaded evidence of similarity. 
In table 2, an additional categorical variable is added (IMF) not used in the cluster analysis. This 
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 GDPPC GGNLB IACP NBTT ODA Cluster IMF FDI 
Brazil 2.61 -3.32 7.04 99.94 1.38 1a 1  5.03 
Colombia 2.91 -2.94 9.22 96.9 4.62 1a 0 2.44 
Peru 1.29 -2.09 3.76 98.51 15.49 1b 0 1.56 
Chile 4.09 -0.06 3.84 92.75 3.19 1b 0 6.24 
Argentina -1.89 -3.33 -0.94 96.91 1.63 2a 0 3.67 
Uruguay -2.28 -3.34 4.76 103.73 5.6 2a 1 1.15 
Paraguay -4.26 -0.95 8.98 107.28 15.74 2b 0 1.32 
Bolivia 0.58 -3.73 4.6 110.34 58.28 2b 1 8.77 
Venezuela 1.75 7.53 16.21 81.63 3.25 3 0 4.01 
Ecuador -0.75 -0.31 96.1 91.23 11.66 3 1 -0.13 
Guyana -0.97 2.83 6.11 98.71 155.25 4 1 9.42 
Suriname -1.21 -8.31 29.56 97.03 77.56 5 0 -16.59 
Mean 0.16 -1.50 15.77 97.91 29.47   2.24 
Median -0.09 -2.52 6.58 97.77 8.63   3.06 
St Dev 2.36 3.74 25.35 7.19 44.53   6.36 
         
Table 2 Country Case Configurations Ranked by Cluster Membership results, 2000 
 
Cluster one is split between two distinct pairs. Cluster 1a, Brazil and Colombia, share similar 
variable characteristics for GDPPC, ggnlb, IACP, and oda. Cluster 1b, Peru and Chile, share similar 
variable characteristics for GDPPC, GGNLB, iacp, and no IMF interventions. Cluster two is split between 
two similar pairs, a and b. Cluster 2a, Argentina and Uruguay, share shaded scores for gdppc, ggnlb, iacp, 
and oda. Cluster 2b, Paraguay and Bolivia share scores for NBTT and ODA. The third cluster, Venezuela 
and Ecuador share GGNLB, IACP, and nbtt. Guyana and Suriname are outliers. The clusters indicate 
several different economic patterns that characterise the groupings, but none of the similarity groupings 
have similar FDI characteristics. One of the outliers, Guyana, as the highest FDI score and did experience 
IMF intervention. There is little evidence overall of the diverse economic patterns influencing FDI in 2000 
for these twelve countries. Table 3 ranks the configurations differently to table 2, to demonstrate more 
clearly the configurations of IMF interventions with FDI outcomes. As a result, the economic cluster 
grouping are dispersed. 
The first group has higher FDI outcomes and prior IMF interventions (Brazil, Bolivia, and 
Guyana). The other shared shaded variable for this group is higher NBTT. The second group (Chile, 
Argentina, and Venezuela) also has higher FDI outcomes, but they have achieved these without prior IMF 
interventions. This group shares shaded scores for lower nbtt and oda. The third group (Uruguay and 
Ecuador) have lower FDI, despite experiencing IMF interventions. The other shared shaded score for this 
pair is lower gdppc. The final group (Colombia, Peru, Paraguay, and Suriname) have lower FDI outcomes 
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 GDPPC GGNLB IACP NBTT ODA Cluster IMF FDI 
Guyana -0.97 2.83 6.11 98.71 155.25 4 1 9.42 
Bolivia 0.58 -3.73 4.6 110.34 58.28 2 1 8.77 
Brazil 2.61 -3.32 7.04 99.94 1.38 1 1 5.03 
Venezuela 1.75 7.53 16.21 81.63 3.25 3 0 4.01 
Chile 4.09 -0.06 3.84 92.75 3.19 1 0 6.24 
Argentina -1.89 -3.33 -0.94 96.91 1.63 2 0 3.67 
Ecuador -0.75 -0.31 96.1 91.23 11.66 3 1 -0.13 
Uruguay -2.28 -3.34 4.76 103.73 5.6 1 1 1.15 
Paraguay -4.26 -0.95 8.98 107.28 15.74 2 0 1.32 
Peru 1.29 -2.09 3.76 98.51 15.49 1 0 1.56 
Suriname -1.21 -8.31 29.56 97.03 77.56 5 0 -16.59 
Colombia 2.91 -2.94 9.22 96.9 4.62 1 0 2.44 
Mean 0.16 -1.50 15.77 97.91 29.47   2.24 
Median -0.09 -2.52 6.58 97.77 8.63   3.06 
St Dev 2.36 3.74 25.35 7.19 44.53   6.36 
 
Table 3 Country Case Configurations Ranked by FDI Outcome and Prior IMF Interventions, 2000 
 
Figure 2 shows the clusters resulting from the 2008 data analysis. The first cluster comprises of 
Argentina, Colombia, Brazil and Ecuador. The second cluster comprises of Bolivia, Paraguay, and Chile. 
The third cluster is Peru and Uruguay. The fourth cluster is Suriname and Guyana. Venezuela is an 
outlier. 
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Figure 2 HCA Dendrogram: Core Economic Characteristics, South American Countries, 2008 
 
Table 4 shows the cluster configurations and provides evidence of which variables are contributing 
the most to each cluster construction. Again, an additional categorical variable is added. This dichotomous 
categorical variable indicates which countries have had one or more IMF prior loan interventions for the 
seven-year period before 2008.  
Cluster one is divided into two sub-groups based on the configurational evidence of similarity. 
Cluster 1a comprises of Colombia and Argentina and they share shaded scores of gdppc and ggnlb.  
Cluster 1b, Brazil and Ecuador, share lower scores for fdi, higher scores for GDPPC, and lower scores for 
iacp and oda.  IMF prior interventions are confirmed for both countries. Cluster two is also divided into 
two homogenous sub-groups. Cluster 2a, Bolivia and Paraguay, share shaded scores for GDPPC, GGNLB, 
IACP, ODA, and IMF prior interventions.  Cluster 2b, is a partial outlier in this cluster, Chile, which shares 
shaded scores with the cluster for GGNLB and IACP. Cluster 3, Peru and Uruguay, share shaded scores 
for GDPPC, iacp, and FDI, with both having experienced IMF interventions.  Cluster 4, Guyana and 
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Country GDPPC GGNLB IACP NBTT ODA Cluster IMF FDI 
Colombia 2.33 -0.25 7.00 148.86 21.75 1a 0 4.33 
Argentina 3.00 0.23 8.59 139.48 2.97 1a 1 2.69 
Brazil 4.03 -1.53 5.68 109.78 2.34 1b 1 2.99 
Ecuador 4.57 0.56 8.40 146.06 15.86 1b 1 1.71 
Bolivia 4.40 3.57 14.01 173.34 65.45 2a 1 3.07 
Paraguay 4.94 2.96 10.19 92.70 22.29 2a 1 1.83 
Chile 2.43 3.58 8.72 169.63 6.37 2b 0 10.28 
Peru 7.80 2.68 5.79 148.07 16.36 3 1 5.74 
Uruguay 6.82 -1.59 7.88 85.42 9.87 3 1 7.05 
Guyana 1.93 -1.92 8.10 102.82 218.34 4 1 9.29 
Suriname 3.04 1.61 14.67 119.02 197.30 4 0 -6.55 
Venezuela 3.80 -2.02 31.44 446.61 2.20 5 0 0.66 
Mean 4.09 0.66 10.87 156.82 48.43   3.59 
Median 3.92 0.40 8.50 142.77 16.11   3.03 
St Dev 1.71 2.08 6.76 91.62 73.25   4.22 
Table 4 Country Case Configurations Ranked by Cluster Membership Results, 2008 
Table 5 reconfigures the 2008 data to compare the FDI outcomes with prior IMF interventions. 
The first group have shared shaded higher FDI outcomes and prior IMF interventions (Bolivia, Peru, 
Uruguay, and Guyana). No other economic characteristics are similar for all four.  Another group 
(Colombia and Chile) also have higher FDI outcomes, but they have achieved these without prior IMF 
interventions. This pair also shares scores for gdpcc and NBTT. Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Paraguay 
have lower FDI, despite experiencing IMF interventions. The four do not share other similar economic 
characteristics. The final group (Suriname and Venezuela) have lower FDI outcomes and did not 
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Country GDPPC GGNLB IACP NBTT ODA Cluster IMF FDI 
Guyana 1.93 -1.92 8.10 102.82 218.34 4 1 9.29 
Uruguay 6.82 -1.59 7.88 85.42 9.87 3 1 7.05 
Peru 7.80 2.68 5.79 148.07 16.36 3 1 5.74 
Bolivia 4.40 3.57 14.01 173.34 65.45 2 1 3.07 
Brazil 4.03 -1.53 5.68 109.78 2.34 1 1 2.99 
Argentina 3.00 0.23 8.59 139.48 2.97 1 1 2.69 
Paraguay 4.94 2.96 10.19 92.70 22.29 2 1 1.83 
Ecuador 4.57 0.56 8.40 146.06 15.86 1 1 1.71 
Chile 2.43 3.58 8.72 169.63 6.37 2 0 10.28 
Colombia 2.33 -0.25 7.00 148.86 21.75 1 0 4.33 
Venezuela 3.80 -2.02 31.44 446.61 2.20 5 0 0.66 
Suriname 3.04 1.61 14.67 119.02 197.30 4 0 -6.55 
Mean 4.09 0.66 10.87 156.82 48.43   3.59 
Median 3.92 0.40 8.50 142.77 16.11   3.03 
St Dev 1.71 2.08 6.76 91.62 73.25   4.22 
 
Table 5 Country Case Configurations Ranked by FDI Outcome and Prior IMF Interventions, 2008 
 
The cluster analysis for 2015 (figure 3) data produced the following clusters. Cluster 1 has four 
countries with two pairs: Colombia and Guyana; Uruguay and Peru. Cluster 2 has three members: 
Argentina, Paraguay, and Ecuador. Chile (cluster 3), Bolivia (cluster 4), and Venezuela (cluster 6) are 
outliers. Cluster 5 comprises Suriname and Brazil. 
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Figure 3 HCA Dendrogram: Core Economic Characteristics, South American Countries, 2015 
 
Table 6 shows the case configurations again based on the transformations of the variables to above 
and below threshold scores. Because there were no new IMF loans to these South American countries 
between 2007 and 2014, the IMF priors categorical variable has been reconfigured in this analysis of 2015 
data.  The IMF prior variable now comprises of three ordinal categories to reflect IMF prior interventions 
between 1996 and 2007. Category 0 means that zero loans were made. Category 1 means between 1 and 2 
loans were made; category 2 means that 3 or more loans were made. 
Cluster one can be divided into two similar pairs. Group 1a, Colombia and Guyana, share shaded 
scores for FDI, GDPPC, GGNLB, nbtt, and ODA. Group 1b, Peru and Uruguay, share scores for FDI and 
GGNLB and share the highest rating for prior IMF interventions. Cluster 2 includes Argentina, Ecuador, 
and Paraguay. The shared shaded scores are for fdi and prior IMF interventions are in the mid-range. 





Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol. 6, No 1 (2020) Special Issue: Global Governance in Complex Times: Exploring 
New Concepts and Theories on Institutional Complexity, 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-103
p. 14-31     
 
 
   26 
 
 




Country GDPPC GGNLB IACP NBTT ODA Cluster IMF FDI 
Colombia 2.12 -3.41 5.00 110.35 28.11 1a 0 4.03 
Guyana 2.62 -0.21 -0.87 115.42 41.88 1a 1 4.31 
Peru 1.92 -2.20 3.55 159.10 10.67 1b 2 4.36 
Uruguay 0.02 -3.58 8.67 106.12 6.75 1b 2 4.57 
Argentina 1.70 -5.79 10.62 146.93 -0.43 2 1 1.98 
Ecuador -1.40 -5.26 3.97 118.97 19.71 2 1 1.33 
Paraguay 1.62 -2.41 3.13 108.57 9.06 2 1 1.94 
Chile 1.11 -1.86 4.35 188.90 3.02 3 0 8.63 
Bolivia 3.27 -6.90 4.06 94.85 73.78 4 1 1.68 
Brazil -4.37 -10.33 9.03 108.38 4.87 5 2 4.15 
Suriname -3.53 -9.36 6.90 128.05 28.89 5 0 3.81 
Venezuela -4.73 -9.01 121.74 268.29 1.22 6 1 0.24 
Mean 0.03 -5.03 15.01 137.83 18.96  1.00 3.42 
Median 1.37 -4.42 4.68 117.20 9.87  1.00 3.92 
St Dev 2.71 3.16 32.32 46.95 20.76  0.64 2.10 
 
Table 6 Country Case Configurations Ranked by Cluster Membership Results, 20152 
 
. 
This final 2015 table 7 is a reconfigured version of table 6 to rank FDI outcomes. This makes it 
easier to see if any overall configurational patterns are influencing FDI outcomes for all the possible 
variable influences, including prior IMF interventions. The first group are three countries (Peru, Uruguay, 
and Brazil) that have experienced 3 or more prior IMF interventions and experience higher FDI in 2015. 
The second group includes six countries that have experienced a mid-range of IMF interventions. With 
the expectation of  Guyana, these countries have lower fdi. The third group is the pair of Colombia and 
Chile who have no prior record of IMF interventions in the twenty years before 2015 but are experiencing 
higher FDI. They also share higher GGNLB. . Finally, Suriname has no record of previous IMF 













2 Note:  IMF variable is an ordinal variable, based on the number of prior loans from 1996 – 2007. There were no IMF loans 
made to South American countries between 2007 – 2015.  Category of 0 = 0 loans, 1 = 1 or 2 loans, 2 = 3 or more loans 
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Country GDPPC GGNLB Inflation NBTT ODA Cluster IMF FDI 
Uruguay 0.02 -3.58 8.67 106.12 6.75 1 2 4.57 
Brazil -4.37 -10.33 9.03 108.38 4.87 5 2 4.15 
Peru 1.92 -2.20 3.55 159.10 10.67 1 2 4.36 
Guyana 2.62 -0.21 -0.87 115.42 41.88 1 1 4.31 
Argentina 1.70 -5.79 10.62 146.93 -0.43 2 1 1.98 
Paraguay 1.62 -2.41 3.13 108.57 9.06 2 1 1.94 
Bolivia 3.27 -6.90 4.06 94.85 73.78 4 1 1.68 
Ecuador -1.40 -5.26 3.97 118.97 19.71 2 1 1.33 
Venezuela -4.73 -9.01 121.74 268.29 1.22 6 1 0.24 
Colombia 2.12 -3.41 5.00 110.35 28.11 1 0 4.03 
Chile 1.11 -1.86 4.35 188.90 3.02 3 0 8.63 
Suriname -3.53 -9.36 6.90 128.05 28.89 5 0 3.81 
Mean 0.03 -5.03 15.01 137.83 18.96   1.00 3.42 
Median 1.37 -4.42 4.68 117.20 9.87  1.00 3.92 
St Dev 2.71 3.16 32.32 46.95 20.76  0.45 2.10 
 
Table 7 Case and variable configurations ranked by FDI outcomes, 2015 
 
Discussion 
Table 8 shows the variable averages when comparing the three time points studied (2000, 2008, 
2015). This gives some indication of the trajectory of each indicator in the period studied, but it is not a 
trend analysis that includes each intervening year. 
 
 FDI GDPPC GGNLB IACP NBTT ODA 
2000 3.06 -0.09 -2.52 6.58 97.77 8.63 
2008 3.03 3.92 0.40 8.50 142.77 16.11 
2015 3.92 1.37 -4.42 4.68 117.20 9.87 
 
             Table 8 Variable trends: averages for 12 South American countries, 2000, 2008, 2015 
 
Foreign Direct Investment as a percentage of GDP is stable between 2000 and 2008, with an 
incremental upward trajectory after the financial crisis in the period when the IMF lending is not active 
in South America. Gross Domestic Product per Capita is negative at the time of the South American Debt 
crisis in 2000, and peaks at the beginning of the financial crisis. This is because the global financial crisis 
had a mild effect on many South American countries with economies dominated by the export of 
commodities—many of which were quite high in prices. These countries were relatively disconnected 
from financial flows between some of the global financial centres (i.e. Wall Street, City of London, Hong 
Kong, etc).   
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Gross government borrowing turns negative in 2015, perhaps indicating an ease for governments 
in raising borrowing in the post 2008 crisis period when they are not dependent on the IMF. Inflation also 
shows some downward consolidation after the 2008 financial crisis. Net barter terms of trade, as a measure 
of export earnings over import earnings, is at its most positive at the beginning of the global financial 
crisis in 2008, as the dollar begins to strengthen making exports more competitive. This indicator remains 
positive in 2015. Overseas Development Assistance as a percentage of GDP is at its highest in 2008. 
When the influence of IMF interventions is configured with FDI outcomes there is no evidence of 
universal related patterns with the other economic data (tables 3, 5, 7). Small groups of countries are 
periodically influenced by certain variable patterns, but the patterns are time limited and dynamic over the 
medium and longer term.  
In 2000, Guyana, Bolivia, and Brazil experience considerably above average FDI and above average 
terms of trade. Inflation is close to, or below, average for these countries and government borrowing is 
below -4% (where the maximum lend is -8%).  Their economies are stable and IMF lending seems to 
contribute to this stability with resulting inward investment. But other configurations are rather different 
and do not follow this trend. Venezuela, Chile, and Argentina achieve lower rates of FDI (still above 
average) but without IMF loans. Terms of trade, and overseas development assistance are below average 
for these three economies. They are a dissimilar group of countries and all were situated in different 
economic clusters in the HCA stage of the analysis (table 2). This is most likely a reflection of the differing 
conditions of their specialist trade markets at that time. Such markets can be a key magnet for inward 
investment when a specific market is growing, but subject to limited growth periods and fluctuations. In 
contrast, Ecuador and Uruguay have considerably below average FDI, despite receiving IMF loans. They 
share below average (and negative) gross domestic product growth. This suggests their economic 
performance is not sufficient to appeal to inward investment at a time when other South American 
countries have economies performing better. The exploratory cluster analysis of economic performance 
(table 2) confirms four countries in cluster 1 with considerably above average gross domestic product 
growth (ranging from 1% to 4%) and three achieve above average FDI, but only one has received IMF 
support (Brazil). The lack of generality to the link between growth and FDI is evidenced when one sees 
that the highest FDI performance at 9% is from two countries Bolivia and Guyana, both with weaker 
growth below 1%. These nations also share above average terms of trade. Here there is a different 
attraction for inward investment, again likely to be specific to the unique trade each country offers and the 
context of that trade market. 
In 2008, the highest growth countries, Peru and Uruguay (rates above 7%) in cluster 3 (table 4) 
also have some of the highest rates of FDI (above 6%) and experienced IMF interventions. They share 
below average inflation at a time when the average is relatively high at 8%. Nevertheless, the highest rates 
of FDI (above 9%) are from countries with their own very different economic characteristics and below 
average rates of growth (Chile, Guyana). Table 5 also evidences that Chile and Colombia are lower growth 
countries achieving above average FDI and without IMF loans. Brazil and Ecuador in cluster 1 (table 4) 
are two countries that share above average growth and experienced IMF interventions but, in contrast, 
only achieve below average FDI. The overall picture is complex, with the likelihood of numerous 
contingencies impacting countries economic performance and the IMF only one influence amongst 
numerous others. The limited case patterns are temporary and contingent and do not settle into 
homogeneous and generalizable relationships over time. 
After the financial crisis, in 2015, all the nations have not experienced further IMF interventions. 
The reference in tables 6 and 7 to IMF loans is historical, summarizing interventions between 1996 and 
2007.  In table 6, the relationship between growth and FDI shows equifinality with outcomes of above 
average FDI (>4%) resulting from both above average positive growth (Colombia and Guyana) in cluster 
1a,  and shared negative below average growth (Brazil and Suriname) in cluster 5. The latter two have an 
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economic performance that is noticeably worse than many of their peers (substantial pressures on 
government borrowing, and higher rates of inflation).  Peru and Uruguay (cluster 1b) have a history of 
greater frequency of previous IMF loans compared to other countries and share above average restraint 
on government borrowing at a time when all countries have moved into negative territory with this 
indicator (average = -4%). Possibly the restraint on government borrowing is linked to previous 
reinforcement of IMF discipline. They continue to attract above average FDI. Table7 shows that Brazil 
shares the interventionalist IMF history of Peru and Uruguay, and yet continues to attract FDI despite the 
evidence on borrowing and inflation that it has neglected the IMF’s classical economic disciplines. In 
2015, Colombia and Chile are the other economies with above average FDI performance, yet with no recent 
history of IMF involvement. Nevertheless, government borrowing, and inflation also show some evidence 
of ‘economic discipline’, demonstrating close to average or below average achievements when compared 
to the other nations.  
When IMF interventions in the sample are examined over the period 2000 -2015 there is no 
evidence of a core mechanistic and predictive effect with regard to IMF interventions and FDI. There is 
some evidence of geographical location driving partial economic similarity as several pairings in the cluster 
analysis dendrograms show evidence of this type of similarity in 2000 and 2008 (e.g. Colombia and Brazil; 
Bolivia and Paraguay; Peru and Uruguay; Guyana and Suriname). After this, such similarity between 
neighbour countries is not evident.  
As regards, considering the possible influence of IMF interventions on future FDI there is a 
multifinality of results. IMF interventions look to be related to higher foreign direct investment in some 
countries, but not in others. Levels of growth also look to be a significant influence on FDI in some 
circumstances, but not others.  After 2008 the IMF is much less active in the 12 countries studied, but 
average foreign direct investment as a proportion of GDP remains stable (table 8). Similarly, there is little 
evidence of a consistent pattern of intervening economic factors in these FDI patterns. There is some 
limited evidence in 2015 that countries with less negative outcomes for government borrowing are more 
likely to secure better performance for FDI (Table 7: see Peru, Uruguay, Guyana, Colombia, Chile) where 
Brazil is an exception with government debt of 10% of gross domestic product. This pattern is temporal 
and not evidenced in 2008 and 2000. 
The complexity and case configurational approach highlights the indeterminate outcomes of IMF 
interventions. Neoliberal accounts see the IMF as a global banking institution that restructures national 
economies towards a more liberal market place which will prove attractive for future investors (Homedes 
& Ugalde, 2005; Yeldan, 2006). They argue only market investment and activity can bring prosperity. 
Countries must depend on private finance rather than government and central bank expansion of the 
economy if they are to become prosperous. The alternative Neo-Marxist accounts of the IMF argue instead 
that this is a global capitalist institution seeking to spread the doctrine of ‘hyper marketization’ where 
capital must flow freely in and out of countries and extract maximum profit, regardless of the social and 
environmental cost to the local population. IMF conditions to privatize state assets and services are seen 
as the key evidence of this pro-market ‘anti-social’ policy (Thacker, 1999).  
The complexity perspective lies somewhere between these two approaches, but arguably closer to 
the structuralism of Marxism than the market liberalism of the imperative of open capital markets. The 
IMF is not an ‘honest broker’ of global finance as international relations pluralism might suggest. Its 
policy approach and agenda are driven by the most powerful, richest, and influential nations. The 
complexities of the global political economy are therefore structured by these dominant countries and their 
economic orthodoxy.  Nevertheless, complexity demonstrates that there is some agency within individual 
nation states as they pursue their own agendas and partner with others against the dominant ideologies 
that sometimes feel against their national interests. The nature of the global market place is that it is 
politically steered by the dominant ideologies, but not totally controlled by authoritarian dictates. 
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Therefore, at times, individual countries pursue their own interests and appear to be resisting the 
economic orthodoxy represented by the IMF (Spronk, 2008). The nature of the global market system is 
that it is relatively unstable, with flows of money that are very difficult to predict with any high degree of 
accuracy. While the flows follow reinforced patterns, such as the ‘flight of capital’ at certain times, from 
certain countries, these patterns are dynamic (Stiglitz, 2004). They are not static and cyclic with any precise 
temporal repetition. This is complex system instability that is difficult to manage and predict. 
There is much uncertainty in the operation of international relations in such unstable market 
conditions and while national politics seeks to bring order to such chaos, to provide stability for a 
population, the ‘trial and error’ of policy interventions is more an art form than a science (Geyer & Rihani, 
2010; Haynes, 2012). It is not surprising that in such circumstances some governments behave 
ambivalently towards the IMF. They seek to relate to it in some circumstances and to resist it in others. 
Since 2015, several South American countries have begun to return to IMF lending for economic support. 
There continues to be discussions about the IMF changing the focus of their lending towards a notion of 
macroeconomic stability that might include social goals like reduced inequality and sustainability, but no 
clarity about how international policy interventions will adjust to achieve this (Inman, 2019). 
Conclusion 
As for the international role of the IMF in South America, there is little evidence that it has 
delivered economic stability in the last twenty years. Its language and rhetoric may have changed with 
more recent mention of goals such as macro-economic stability, reducing inequality, and lending to 
promote sustainability, but the nature of the conditions imposed on its lending suggest it will be many 
decades before such change in language changes the IMF’s actual behaviour. Complexity explains the 
limited success of the IMF in South America. There is no single pattern or economic mechanism that the 
IMF can transfer to nations that guarantee it will achieve success with its lending. In addition, global 
political instability reflects global economic instability. If the highest international political goals are the 
free operation of the capital markets, politics merely mirrors the instability and chaos of these goals. 
Complexity implies that the global international arena needs to do better at negotiating shared values and 
a core and adaptable policy framework for intervention if there is to be more political and economic 
stability. Such a form of international political system, policy transfer, and financial environment has not 
been achieved in the current era of globalization. 
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